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CASE COMMENTARIES 
BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 
Under Sixth Circuit law, filing a suit in an attempt to settle a case 
does not constitute an abuse of process. Penn, LLC v. Prosper Bus. Dev. 
Corp., 600 F. App’x 393 (Jan. 23, 2015). 
By Harolda Bryson 
In Penn, LLC v. Prosper Bus. Dev. Corp., 600 F. App’x 393 (Jan. 23, 
2015), the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit addressed 
the issue of whether filing a suit in an attempt to settle a case constitutes 
an abuse of process, absent evidence of an improper ulterior motive.1 
In 2000, Penn, LLC (“Penn”) and Prosper Business 
Development Corporation (“Prosper”) together formed BIGresearch, 
LLC (“BIGresearch”). Each party owned 50 percent of BIGresearch’s 
shares, and its board consisted of one representative from Penn and two 
representatives from Prosper. Following the formation, BIGresearch 
sold approximately five percent of its shares to outside investors.  
In 2004, Prosper purchased a portion of the sold shares, giving it 
a majority stake in BIGresearch, and used its newfound majority 
ownership to remove Penn’s representative from the board. In response, 
Penn challenged the legality of Prosper’s actions and demanded 
arbitration.  
In 2008, the arbitrator ruled in favor of Penn and restored Penn’s 
membership on the BIGresearch board. In addition, a third-party was 
appointed to determine the amount of distributions that Penn’s shares 
should have earned during the “freeze-out” period, even though Prosper 
still occupied a majority of the board. 
In 2009, while the third-party was preparing the report, Prosper 
voted to completely dissolve BIGresearch. In response, Penn filed suit in 
an Ohio court, seeking to enjoin the dissolution. In 2010, while the Ohio 
suit was pending, the third-party’s financial report was finished and the 
arbitrator adopted the damages award of $1,488,000 in favor of Penn. 
Later, in 2011, the court found that the dissolution was valid. 
On appeal, Prosper and Penn entered into settlement 
negotiations, where Prosper offered to pay Penn $1,500,000 in exchange 
for a release from all liability. Following the offer, Penn countered with a 
                                                             
1 The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit also addressed other issues 
not covered in this synopsis. 
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request of $1,750,000. Weeks later, Penn’s attorney called Prosper’s 
attorney in order to remind him of the settlement and to inform him that 
Penn “intended to file a new complaint against Prosper . . . unless it 
accepted the proposal.” Penn called a second time stating the same thing, 
but also threatened to sue Prosper’s counsel as co-defendants. A month 
later, the Ohio court upheld the arbitrator’s award and reduced it, such 
that Prosper only had to pay an amount of approximately$750,000 to 
Penn. 
Penn filed suit once more against Prosper, alleging RICO 
violations, fraud, conversion, unjust enrichment, and breach of fiduciary 
duty. After filing the suit, Penn called Prosper again to talk about the 
settlement, offering to accept the $750,000 award as part of the 
$1,750,000 it previously requested. Prosper then filed a counterclaim, 
alleging abuse of process. 
Under the applicable forum state’s law, in this case Ohio, an 
abuse of process counterclaim requires: 
1) that a legal proceeding has been set in 
motion in proper form and with probable 
cause; 2) that the proceeding has been 
perverted to attempt to accomplish an 
ulterior purpose for which it was not 
designed; and 3) that direct damage has 
resulted from the wrongful use of the 
process. 
At trial, the District Court upheld Prosper’s counterclaim, reasoning that 
Penn used threats and the suit as “bargaining chips” to leverage 
settlement negotiations. Penn appealed. 2  On appeal, the Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s holding, finding 
that Penn did not engage in an abuse of process. 
Under Sixth Circuit law, generally, it is not an abuse of process to 
file a suit in an attempt to settle a case. First, an abuse of process claim 
must show that the suit involves issues that are not properly before the 
court. Second, it must be shown that the proceeding has been perverted, 
such that the abusing party is attempting to use the court to order 
something that it is powerless to order. Finally, the abusive suit must 
have damaged the other party. 
                                                             
2 Penn only challenged the second part of the test. 
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The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals found that Penn’s suit did 
not constitute an abuse of process because: 1) Penn’s claims were viable 
and properly before the court; 2) Penn’s requested relief by the court was 
proper and within the court’s power; and 3) Prosper failed to show how 
it was damaged by Penn’s suit. As such, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling, holding 
that a party may file a lawsuit in an attempt to settle a case, as long as the 
party is not filing the lawsuit in an effort to achieve an improper ulterior 
objective. 
In light of this decision, transactional attorneys in the Sixth 
Circuit should know that federal courts apply the forum state’s law on 
filing an abuse of process claim, and that filing a suit or threatening to 
file a suit in an attempt to settle a case, does not constitute an abuse of 
process, unless the suit alleges violations that are improperly before the 
court. Further, for an abuse of process claim to be upheld, the claiming 
party must provide evidence showing an ulterior motive to filing the suit. 
Courts have found ulterior motives where the party who initiated the 
lawsuit asked the court to reach beyond its authority, or where the party 
alleges invalid claims or claims unrelated to the subject matter of the suit. 
CONTRACTS 
The Supreme Court of the United States held that courts shall 
interpret welfare plans contained in employee collective-
bargaining agreements using ordinary principles of contract law. 
M & G Polymers USA, L.L.C. v. Tackett, 135 S. Ct. 926 (2015). 
By Spencer Cook 
In M & G Polymers USA, L.L.C. v. Tackett, 135 S. Ct. 926 (2015), 
the United States Supreme Court addressed whether ordinary principles 
of contract law permit an inference, drawn from extraneous knowledge 
of labor bargaining, that absent a specific durational clause, retiree health 
care benefits vest for life.  In Tackett v. M & G Polymers USA, Inc., 561 
F.3d 478 (6th Cir. 2009) (“Tackett I”), the Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit applied the holding from its previous decision in International 
Union, United Automobile, Aerospace, & Agricultural Implement Workers of 
America (UAW) v. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476 (6th Cir. 1983) (“Yard-
Man”) and its progeny, requiring courts to infer the external context of 
labor negotiations when considering whether collective-bargaining 
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agreements create a vested right to lifetime welfare plans.  In M & G 
Polymers USA, L.L.C. v. Tackett, the United States Supreme Court held 
that courts shall interpret welfare plans contained in employee collective-
bargaining agreements using ordinary principals of contract law, 
abrogating Yard-Man and its progeny. 
 This case arose out of a collective-bargaining agreement between 
M & G Polymers USA, L.L.C. (“M & G”) and the United Steel, Paper 
and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and 
Service Workers International Union, AFL-CIO-CLC (“the Union”).  In 
2000, M & G purchased the Point Pleasant Polyester Plant (“Plant”) and 
entered into a collective-bargaining agreement with the Union that 
represented the Plant’s employees.  This collective-bargaining agreement 
(“C.B.A”) promised that qualifying retirees, along with their surviving 
spouses and dependents, would receive a fully company-funded welfare 
plan for the duration of the C.B.A., which provided for renegotiation in 
three years.  In 2006, M & G began requiring that all retirees contribute 
to the costs of their welfare plan, stripping the retirees of their rights to 
the previously company-funded welfare plans. 
 After M & G ended the employee-funded welfare plan, retirees 
of the Plant, their spouses, and their dependents (“Retirees”), brought a 
class action suit against M & G, asserting claims under the Labor 
Management Relations Act of 1947 (“LMRA”) and the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 891 (“ERISA”).  The 
Retirees alleged that M & G, through the terms of the C.B.A., vested its 
Plant retirees, their surviving spouses, and their dependents with a right 
to lifetime contribution-free health care benefits.   
The district court dismissed the Retirees claims, holding that the 
language contained within the C.B.A. unambiguously did not create a 
vested right to retiree benefits. Tackett v. M & G Polymers USA, L.L.C., 
523 F. Supp. 2d 684 (S.D. Ohio 2007). 
 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the 
Retirees’ stated a plausible claim based on collective-bargaining 
inferences established in Yard-Man. Tackett v. M & G Polymers USA, Inc., 
561 F.3d 478 (6th Cir. 2009).  The court of appeals’ previous decision in 
Yard-Man, and its progeny, required courts to infer “that parties to 
collective bargaining intend[ed] retiree benefits to vest for life because 
such benefits are ‘not mandatory’ or required to be included in 
collective-bargaining agreements, are ‘typically understood as a form of 
delayed compensation or reward for past service,’ and are keyed to the 
acquisition of retirement status.”  The court of appeals reversed and 
remanded the district court’s dismissal of Retirees’ claims. 
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 On remand, the district court conducted a bench trial and ruled 
in favor of the Retirees.  The district court declined to answer whether 
the C.B.A. created a vested right to retiree benefits, “concluding that the 
[c]ourt of [a]ppeals had definitively resolved that issue.” Tackett v. M & G 
Polymers USA, L.L.C., 853 F. Supp. 2d 697 (S.D. Ohio 2012).  The Sixth 
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in favor of the Retirees, holding that 
“although the [d]istrict [c]ourt had erred in treating Tackett I as a 
conclusive resolution of the meaning of the [C.B.A.], it had not erred ‘in 
presum[ing]’ that, ‘in the absence of extrinsic evidence to the contrary, 
the [C.B.A.] indicated an intent to vest lifetime contribution-free 
benefits’.” Tackett v. M & G Polymers USA, L.L.C., 853 F.3d 589 (6th Cir. 
2013) (“Tackett II”). 
 On a grant of certiorari, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth 
Circuit Court of Appeals’ “decision [in Tackett II] rested on principles 
that are incompatible with ordinary principles of contract law.”  The 
Court vacated and remanded the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Tackett II.  
The Supreme Court explained that while “ERISA imposes elaborate 
minimum funding and vesting standards for pension plans . . . it 
explicitly exempts welfare benefit plans from those rules.” Because 
welfare plans are required by ERISA to be established and maintained 
pursuant to a written instrument, the Supreme Court observed that 
“contractual provisions ordinarily should be enforced as written . . . 
especially when enforcing an ERISA [welfare benefits plan].’”  
 The Supreme Court noted that the Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, which relied on its previous decision in Yard-Man, incorrectly 
applied ordinary contract law in Tackett II.  The Supreme Court declared 
that Yard-Man “violate[d] ordinary contract principles by placing a thumb 
on the scale in favor of vested retiree benefits in all collective bargaining 
agreements.”  The Supreme Court concluded that Yard-Man’s holding 
allowed for courts to ascertain the intentions of the parties “not from the 
record evidence, but instead from its own suppositions about the 
intentions of employees, unions, and employers negotiating retiree 
benefits.” 
 Furthermore, the Supreme Court added that the holding in Yard-
Man, as applied in Tackett II, violated other fundamental contract laws, 
such as: 1) applying external inferences when construing durational 
clauses in provisions governing retiree benefits; 2) the misapplication of 
the illusory promises doctrine, which “instructs courts to avoid 
constructions of contracts that would render promises illusory because 
such promises cannot serve as consideration;” 3) the traditional principle 
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that courts should not construe ambiguous writings to create lifetime 
promises; and 4) the traditional principle that “contractual obligations 
will cease, in the ordinary course, upon termination of the bargaining 
agreement.”  The Sixth Circuit’s misapplication of ordinary contract laws 
required the Supreme Court to abrogate Yard-Man and its progeny.  On 
remand, the Supreme Court mandated that the Sixth Circuit apply 
ordinary principles of contract law when it reexamines Tackett. 
 The Court’s decision in Tackett v. M & G Polymers USA, L.L.C., 
drastically departs from prior Sixth Circuit precedent.  With the 
abrogation of Yard-Man and its progeny, the Sixth Circuit must begin a 
new chapter in interpreting the intent of the contracting parties in 
welfare plans contained in collective-bargaining agreements.  The Sixth 
Circuit may no longer apply its own external knowledge of labor 
negotiations to infer the intent of the contracting parties.  Additionally, 
the Court’s abrogation of Yard-Man changes the status quo of collective-
bargaining agreements in favor of employers.  It may become more 
difficult, if not impossible, for unions to negotiate for or maintain 
employer contributed welfare plans without conceding other important 
terms in a collective-bargaining agreement. 
 To ensure that courts can easily interpret the terms of a 
collective-bargaining agreement, practitioners should strive to have each 
party’s intent easily discerned within the “four corners of the document.”  
Furthermore, Tackett v. M & G Polymers USA, L.L.C., dictates that all 
parties engaged in collective-bargaining should, now more than ever, be 
aware of the ordinary laws and principles of contract law when drafting a 
collective-bargaining agreement. 
COPYRIGHT 
The Supreme Court held that the equitable defense of laches does 
not bar relief on a copyright infringement claim brought within the 
three-year statute of limitation period. Petrella v. MGM Inc., 134 S. Ct. 
1962 (2014). 
By Danielle Knight 
In Petrella v. MGM Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1962 (2014), the Supreme 
Court addressed the issue of whether the equitable defense of laches may 
bar relief on a copyright infringement claim brought within 17 U.S.C. § 
507 (b)’s three-year limitations period. 
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Frank Petrella (“Mr. Petrella”) and Jake LaMotta (“LaMotta”) 
collaborated in writing two screenplays and a book. 3  In 1976, Mr. 
Petrella and LaMotta assigned their rights to all three works to Chartoff-
Winkler Productions. Two years later, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer (“MGM”) 
acquired the motion picture rights to the screenplays.  The rights were 
stated to be “exclusive and forever, including all periods of copyright and 
renewals and extensions thereof.”  In 1980, MGM released the film 
Raging Bull, based off the acquired screenplays and book, which is still in 
circulation today.  
In 1981, Mr. Petrella died during the initial copyright term, and 
his renewal rights reverted to his daughter Paula Petrella (“Ms. Petrella”).  
In 1991, Ms. Petrella renewed the 1963 copyright and became the sole 
owner of the copyright.  Over the next eighteen years, Ms. Petrella’s 
attorney notified MGM that she owned the 1963 copyright and was 
threatening legal action for copyright infringement. 
In 2009, Ms. Petrella took action and filed a copyright 
infringement suit in the United States District Court for the Central 
District of California, alleging MGM’s violation of her 1963 copyright.4 
MGM moved for summary judgment based on the equitable defense of 
laches. The district court granted MGM’s motion for summary 
judgment, finding that Ms. Petrella’s eighteen-year delay in commencing 
the suit was unreasonable and prejudicial to MGM. The United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal, finding 
that Ms. Petrella was aware of her rights for many years and delayed her 
suit because “the film hadn’t made money.” 
On certiorari, the Supreme Court of the United States sought to 
resolve: 1) how the equitable defense of laches applies to copyright 
claims; and 2) the irreconcilable outcomes of circuit splits. 
The Copyright Act of 1976 (the “Act”) protects an author’s 
original works from infringement by unauthorized parties. Copyright 
owners may transfer ownership to a third-party, reproduce and distribute 
the copyrighted work, and are protected for a predetermined time based 
on the date of publishing. Copyrighted works published before 1978, as 
in this case, are initially protected for twenty-eight years, with the option 
                                                             
3 The first screenplay was registered in 1963, the second screenplay was registered in 
1973, and the book was registered in 1970. 
4 Ms. Petrella only sought recovery of damages for the time-period on and after January 
6, 2006, because the statute of limitations for copyright claims requires a suit to be 
brought within three years of the infringing action. 
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of renewal up to sixty-seven years. Additionally, for pre-1978 works, the 
Act allows an heir to inherit the renewal rights. 
 Civil actions brought under the Act must be filed within three 
years of the infringing action. Copyright statutes of limitation follow the 
separate-accrual rule: each infringing action starts a new three-year 
limitations period. 
 First, the Supreme Court held that the defense of laches was 
improperly used because its use should be limited to cases in which no 
statute of limitations applies. Here, the copyright statute of limitations 
provides for a three-year look-back period, arising from the date of the 
infringing action. 
 Second, the Supreme Court held that the defense of laches does 
not prevent a copyright owner from “sitting still,” in order to determine 
the likely outcome of an infringing action (also known as an 
expectations-based delay). The separate-accrual rule allows copyright 
owners to defer a suit “until she can estimate whether litigation is worth 
the candle.” 
In light of this decision, transactional attorneys should be aware 
that each copyright-infringing action begins a new three-year statute of 
limitations period. The defense of laches should not be used to defend 
copyright claims and should only be used when a statute of limitations is 
non-existent. Finally, such suits may be delayed, allowing the potential 
plaintiff to see the result of the infringing action, but any profits earned 
by a defendant, outside of the three-year look-back period, are not 
recoverable. 
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT 
Under Tennessee law, employees who fail to take all reasonable 
and necessary steps to protect their employment, voluntarily 
terminate their employment, disqualifying themselves from 
receiving unemployment benefits, absent good cause. Practical 
Ventures, LLC v. Neely, No. W2013–00673–COA–R3–CV, 2014 WL 
2809246, 2014 Tenn. App. LEXIS 348 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 19, 2014). 
By Sonali Arora 
 In Practical Ventures, LLC v. Neely, No. W2013–00673–COA–R3–
CV, 2014 WL 2809246, 2014 Tenn. App. LEXIS 348 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
June 19, 2014), the Tennessee Court of Appeals addressed the issue of 
whether an employee voluntarily terminated her employment, where the 
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employee was suspected of fraud, was temporarily suspended from her 
employment, responded by stating that she was planning on resigning 
anyway, and did not cooperate with the employer’s internal investigation. 
The addressed issues were key in determining whether the employee was 
eligible for unemployment benefits or not. 
 Gordon Ballenger (“Ballenger”), the owner and general manager 
of Practical Ventures, owned and operated AAA Cash Fast (“Cash 
Fast”). Cash Fast was in the business of providing cash advances and 
title loans. Danyelle McCullough (“McCullough”) was the manager of 
Cash Fast’s Memphis, Tennessee branch, and was responsible for 
managing customers’ loans and Cash Fast’s accounting.  
 On January 25, 2010, McCullough submitted a closing report 
that included a summary of the store’s loans and transactions for that 
day to Ballenger. While Ballenger was reviewing the report, he noticed 
the information in the copy of a check was blank, except for the amount.  
After investigating, Ballenger found $15,468 worth of accounting 
discrepancies.  
 Two days later, Ballenger spoke to McCullough over the phone 
and told her that an investigation was under way regarding the financial 
discrepancies in her reports, that her security code had been changed, 
that she was suspended until further notice, and that she needed to 
return her copy of the store key. McCullough told Ballenger that she was 
not concerned about her job because she was planning on quitting on 
the following Saturday.  McCullough never returned to the store to drop-
off the keys or contacted Ballenger again. McCullough was charged with 
seventeen criminal offenses, of which sixteen were dropped. The 
remaining criminal charge was for forging financial documents. 
 Several months later, McCullough filed an application for 
unemployment compensation with the Tennessee Department of Labor 
and Workforce (“Department”). The Department denied McCullough’s 
application, stating that McCullough was disqualified from receiving 
benefits because she was terminated for misappropriation of company 
funds. McCullough appealed to the Department’s Appeals Tribunal.  
 On appeal, the tribunal reversed the prior denial of benefits, 
finding that McCullough was qualified for benefits. The tribunal found 
that McCullough was constructively discharged because Ballenger, by 
suspending McCullough before she told him she was quitting, denied 
McCullough the right to work first.  
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 Ballenger appealed the decision to the Department’s Board of 
Review, which affirmed the tribunal’s holding. Ballenger then filed for 
judicial review in the Chancery Court of Shelby County, Tennessee. The 
trial court upheld the Department’s decision, holding that McCullough 
was effectively terminated, supported by substantial and material 
evidence, and that the Department did not act arbitrarily and 
capriciously. Ballenger appealed once more. 
 On appeal, the Tennessee Court of Appeals held that 
McCullough was not constructively discharged 5 , and that she was 
ineligible for unemployment benefits. Tennessee unemployment statutes 
were enacted to improve the economic effects of involuntary 
unemployment on workers and their families. Workers, who leave their 
job voluntarily and without any good cause, are not  
entitled to unemployment benefits. “Courts will find that an employee 
has voluntarily terminated her employment if the employee fails to take 
all necessary and reasonable steps to protect his or her employment.” 
McPherson v. Strokes, 954 S.W.2d 749 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997). 
 The appellate court reversed the trial court’s decision, holding 
that McCullough voluntarily terminated her employment because she 
failed to take all necessary and reasonable steps to protect her 
employment. Specifically, McCullough failed to cooperate with the 
investigation, did not return the store key, stated that she was planning 
on resigning, and never returned to work. Thus, McCullough was 
ineligible to receive unemployment benefits because she voluntarily 
terminated her employment after Ballinger notified her that she was only 
being suspended. 
 In light of this decision, transactional attorneys in Tennessee 
should be aware that if an employee voluntarily terminates their job 
without good cause, they are be ineligible for unemployment benefits. 
The voluntary termination of unemployment benefits occurs when an 
employee fails to take all reasonable and necessary steps to protect their 
employment. Although this is a fact-intensive inquiry, employee actions 
before, during, and after the conduct in question should be taken into 
account. 
                                                             
5 The doctrine of constructive discharge was improperly applied in this case because it 
is inapplicable in an administrative unemployment compensation proceeding. The 
doctrine of constructive discharge is applicable under state and federal laws prohibiting 
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Practical 
Ventures, LLC, 2014 Tenn. App. LEXIS 348, at *26. 
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PROPERTY 
Under Tennessee Law, the applicable statute of limitations is 
determined by utilizing the Vance two-step approach to analyze 
the gravamen of the claim. Benz-Elliott v. Barrett Enter. LP, 456 S.W.3d 
140 (Tenn. 2015).  
By Zachary Campbell 
 In Benz-Elliot v. Barrett Enter. LP, LP, 456 S.W.3d 140 (Tenn. 
2015) the Tennessee Supreme Court clarified the two-step Vance 
approach, used to determine the gravamen of a case, in order to apply 
the proper statute of limitations. In clarifying the Vance two-step 
approach, the Tennessee Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether 
Benz-Elliott should be governed by a three-year statute of limitations for 
injuries to property, or a six-year statute of limitations for breach of 
contract.  
In Vance v. Schulder, the Tennessee Supreme Court outlined a 
two-part analysis to identify the gravamen of a complaint. Vance v. 
Schulder, 547 S.W.2d 927 (Tenn. 1977). The Vance court sought to correct 
the problems associated with prior decisions by requiring the 
“consideration of both the basis of the claim and the type of injuries for which 
damages are sought.”  Vance, 547 S.W.2d at 932 (emphasis added).  
In Benz-Elliott, Brenda Benz-Elliott (“Ms. Elliott”) brought suit 
against Ronnie Barrett (“Defendant”) and Barrett Enterprises, LP 
(collectively “Defendants”).  Ms. Elliott owned ninety-one acres in 
Rutherford County.  The Defendant owned four acres located on Miller 
Road, adjacent to Ms. Elliott’s property. In 2004, Defendant approached 
Ms. Elliott about purchasing a portion of her property.  Ms. Elliott 
initially sold five acres to Defendant, with the condition that she would 
retain access to a sixty-foot wide strip along Miller Road to connect her 
remaining property to the public road.  Further, Defendant agreed to 
extend Miller Road according to county specifications along I-24. The 
sale was then finalized on March 25, 2005. The warranty deed, however, 
failed to include the contractually-required reservation to provide the 
sixty-foot strip.  Both parties relied on a letter from the Tennessee 
Department of Transportation (“TDOT”) that the required reservation 
would be available.   
On September 22, 2008, Ms. Elliott filed suit against Defendants.  
She later amended her complaint on October 21, 2008, alleging claims 
for breach of contract, intentional misrepresentation, and negligent 
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misrepresentation.  Ms. Elliott requested specific performance and 
money damages.  The Defendants filed an answer to the amended 
complaint and, pursuant to an agreed order, later amended their answer 
to include the three-year statute of limitations provided in Tennessee 
Code Annotated § 28-3-105, among five other affirmative defenses.  
 At trial, the court dismissed Ms. Elliott’s claims of intentional 
and negligent misrepresentation, finding that Ms. Elliott had failed to 
prove her claims. In determining whether there was a breach of contract, 
the trial court focused first on the road, finding that Defendant did not 
build the promised road.  Next, the trial court found that the sixty-foot 
reservation to connect Ms. Elliot’s land did not exist.  In light of these 
two facts, the trial court ruled in favor of Ms. Elliott for the breach of 
contract claim.  The trial court determined that Defendant failed to 
establish the defenses of estoppel, waiver, laches, statute of limitations, 
and modified comparative fault.  The trial court declined to order 
specific performance for Ms. Elliott because the defendant had already 
constructed buildings on the purchased land.  Instead, the trial court 
awarded Ms. Elliott $850,000 in damages for the diminution in value of 
her remaining property, as a result of not having access to a connecting 
public road.  
 At the November 1, 2012 hearing on remand, maps introduced 
into evidence showed that Miller Road was relocated behind Defendant’s 
property, and that the road extended to the southwest corner of Ms. 
Elliott's property, giving her access to a public road.  Russell Parrish, an 
appraiser testifying on behalf of Ms. Elliott, stated that the diminution in 
value of Ms. Elliott's remaining property from the lack of an ingress and 
egress along I-24 was valued at $1,066,496.  Johnny Sullivan, an appraiser 
testifying on behalf of Defendants, stated that in light of the new access 
road, Ms. Elliott sustained no diminution in value of her remaining 
property.  The trial court reduced Ms. Elliott’s award for diminution of 
value by $200,000. 
 On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that the gravamen of the 
claim for which Ms. Elliott prevailed was based on damages to real 
property, and concluded that her claim was barred by the three-year 
statute of limitations. Subsequently, Ms. Elliott's application for 
permission to appeal was granted pursuant to Tennessee Rules of 
Appellate Procedure 11.  
The Tennessee Supreme Court, exercising de novo review, held 
that Ms. Elliot’s claims are to be governed by the six-year statute of 
limitations for breach of contract claims. The Tennessee Supreme Court 
acknowledged that the Vance two-step approach had resulted in 
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irreconcilable differences, and clarified it in the case at hand. The court 
held that in order to determine the applicable statute of limitations, 
courts should determine the gravamen of the claims by: first, considering 
the legal basis for the claim; and second, considering the type of injuries 
for which damages are sought.  
In applying the Vance two-step approach, the Tennessee 
Supreme Court found that the legal basis of Ms. Elliot’s claim was 
breach of contract, and that the damages sought were remedies for 
breach of contract. Thus, the court held that Ms. Elliot’s claims are to be 
subject to a six-year statute of limitations for breach of contract, instead 
of the three-year statute of limitation for real property damages. 
In light of this decision, transactional attorneys in Tennessee 
should be aware of the Vance two-step approach, as clarified by the 
Tennessee Supreme Court in this case. In determining the applicable 
statute of limitations for each claim brought, the gravamen of the claim 
should be determined by analyzing the legal basis of the claim, followed 
by the types of damages sought. 
SECURITIES 
Under the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, a 
misrepresentation or omission of material fact must be material to 
a decision to buy or sell a “covered” security, in order to be made 
“in connection with” that purchase or sale. Chadbourne & Parke LLP 
v. Troice, 134 S. Ct. 1058 (2014). 
By Luke Smith 
In Chadbourne & Parke LLP, 134 S. Ct. 1058 (2014), the United 
States Supreme Court determined how broadly to construe to language 
of the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (the “Act”), 
which requires fraudulent misrepresentation to be made “in connection 
with” the purchase or sale of a covered security. 
Prior to Chadbourne, Allen Stanford (“Stanford”) and his 
companies sold certificates of deposit (“CDs”) in Stanford International 
Bank (“the Bank”) to four groups of private investors (“Plaintiffs”), 
promised a fixed rate of return, and promised that the CDs were secure 
because they were backed by the Bank’s significant holdings in covered 
securities. Plaintiffs’ CDs were not in fact invested, or backed by covered 
securities, but were part of an elaborate Ponzi scheme. The funds were 
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used to repay previous investors and to provide a lavish lifestyle for 
Stanford, among other things. 
In Chadbourne, Plaintiffs brought separate civil class action suits 
against the firms and individuals who helped the Bank sell its CDs by 
working as investment advisers, attorneys, or insurance brokers for the 
Bank (collectively “Defendants”). Two groups of Plaintiffs filed actions 
in Louisiana state court, claiming that Defendants helped perpetrate 
fraud, thereby violating Louisiana state law. Defendants had their cases 
removed to federal court. Two other groups of Plaintiffs filed their 
actions in the federal court for the Northern District of Texas, claiming 
that Defendants helped the Bank perpetrate securities fraud or hide it 
from regulators, thereby violating Texas law. The cases were 
consolidated in the District Court for the Northern District of Texas. 
The district court dismissed all four actions under the Act, 
reasoning that the CDs were not covered securities because they were 
not traded nationally or listed on a regulated exchange. Further, the court 
found that the Bank’s misrepresentations did not provide a sufficient 
“connection” with the purchase or sale of a covered security to trigger 
the Act and dismiss the cases. 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, 
concluding that the Bank’s misrepresentations were “tangentially related” 
to the “crux” of the fraud claims, triggering the Act. The Supreme Court 
granted certiorari in order to determine the scope of the Act’s phrase 
“misrepresentation or omission of a material fact in connection with the 
purchase or sale of a covered security.”  
Under the Act, securities class action suits are not permitted on 
state law claims based on “ a misrepresentation or omission of a material 
fact in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security.” A 
“covered” security is one that is “listed, or authorized for listing, on a 
national securities exchange.”  
The Court held that a fraudulent misrepresentation or omission 
is made “in connection with” the “purchase or sale of a covered 
security” when it is material to a consumer’s decisions to buy or sell a 
“covered security.” “In connection with” refers to those who maintained 
or divested an ownership interest in the covered security. 6  Thus, the 
                                                             
6 The Court showed concern that a broader interpretation would prohibit states from 
being able to provide remedies for victims of more garden-variety fraud. Under a 
broader interpretation, the Act would prohibit a suit brought by creditors of a business 
that falsely represented that it was creditworthy, in part because it owns or intends to 
own a covered security. 
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Court held that Plaintiffs’ allegations failed to state misrepresentations 
that were “in connection” with the purchase or sale of a “covered 
security,” because the misrepresentations alleged were solely about the 
Bank’s fraudulent assurances. Consequently, the necessary connection 
between the materiality of the misstatements and the purchase or sale of 
a covered security did not exist. 
 In light of this decision, transactional attorneys should know that 
the Court intends for the phrase “in connection with” to be broadly 
construed, in order to allow flexibility in a court’s choice of remedies. 
Also, in determining whether or not a fraudulent misrepresentation has 
been made, it is important to show that the consumer’s decision to 
purchase or sell a covered security was influenced by a material 
misrepresentation. 
TRADEMARK 
The Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (the “FDCA”) does not 
preclude commercial entities from bringing lawsuits against their 
competitors, under the Lanham Act, for allegedly deceptive 
labeling of a product, even if the challenged aspects of the labeling 
are specifically required or authorized by the FDCA. POM Wonderful 
LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228 (2014). 
By Rebekah Raymond 
In POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228 (2014), 
the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a private party may 
bring suit under the Lanham Act, challenging a label regulated by the 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (the “FDCA”). The unanimous Court 
held that the Lanham Act and the FDCA are complementary, and that a 
private party is not precluded by the FDCA from bringing suit under the 
Lanham Act.  
POM Wonderful LLC (“POM”) produces, markets, and sells a 
variety of pomegranate products, including a pomegranate-blueberry 
juice blend. POM competes in the pomegranate-blueberry juice market 
with Coca-Cola’s Minute Maid brand. POM sued Coca-Cola under the 
Lanham Act for unfair competition arising from false or misleading 
product descriptions, which allegedly deceived consumers, and injured 
POM as a competitor. POM alleged that Coca-Cola’s product name, 
label, marketing, and advertising misled consumers into believing that 
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the product consisted predominately of pomegranate and blueberry juice, 
when it only consisted of 0.3 percent pomegranate juice and 0.2 percent 
blueberry juice. 
Congress enacted the Lanham Act nearly seven decades ago in 
order to protect commercial entities from unfair competition. The 
Lanham Act allows a competitor to sue another competitor for unfair 
competitive advantages, arising from false or misleading product 
descriptions. 
The FDCA regulates foods, drugs, and cosmetics, in order to 
protect public health and public safety. In doing so, the FDCA relies 
solely on the United States government for its enforcement, as there are 
no private rights of action provided for by the FDCA. Under the FDCA, 
misleading labels for foods and beverages are prohibited. A food or 
beverage is deemed misbranded if: 1) its labeling is false or misleading; 2) 
the information required to appear on its label is not conspicuously 
displayed; or 3) its label does not bear the common or usual name of the 
food. Under the FDCA, the Food and Drug Administration (the 
“FDA”) has regulatory authority over food and beverage label claims. To 
implement the above stated provisions, the FDA promulgated 
regulations regarding food and beverage labeling, one of which states: 
“[i]f a juice blend label does not name all the juices it contains and 
mentions only juices not predominant in the blend, it is misleading 
unless it either declares the percentage content of the named juice or 
indicates that the named juice is present as a flavor or flavoring.”  
The United States District Court for the Central Division of 
California granted partial summary judgment to Coca-Cola on POM’s 
Lanham Act claim, ruling that the FDCA and its regulations preclude 
challenges to the name and label of Coca-Cola’s juice blend. The court 
reasoned that since the FDA had not prohibited, but rather in some 
instances expressly permitted, aspects of Coca-Cola’s label, it would, in 
this instance, be inconsistent with FDA regulations to allow a Lanham 
Act claim.  
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in relevant 
part, and “out of respect for the statutory and regulatory scheme barred 
POM’s Lanham Act claim.” The court reasoned that: 1) Congress had 
entrusted matters of juice beverage labeling to the FDA; 2) the FDA had 
promulgated comprehensive regulation of that labeling; and 3) the FDA 
apparently had not imposed the requirements on Coca-Cola’s label that 
POM sought. The Court of Appeals further explained that for a court to 
act when the FDA had not, despite regulating extensively in this area, 
would risk undercutting the FDA’s expert judgments and authority. 
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 The Supreme Court held that the FDCA does not preclude 
Lanham Act claims, reasoning that the two federal laws at issue are 
complementary. Further, the Lanham Act’s purpose is to protect 
commercial entities from unfair competition, while the FDCA’s purpose 
is to protect consumer health and safety. Finally, neither the FDCA nor 
the Lanham Act contain limiting language with respect to unfair 
competition claims. If the FDCA was intended to bar certain claims 
brought under the Lanham Act, Congress could have added a provision 
addressing this issue during the seventy year existence of the Lanham 
Act.  
 In light of this decision, attorneys should know that the Lanham 
Act and the FDCA are complementary federal laws with the same overall 
goal: to prevent companies from misleading consumers and creating 
unfair competitive advantages. It is not enough for a company to be in 
compliance with the FDCA’s regulations because: 1) being in compliance 
with FDCA regulations will not preclude a Lanham Act claim; and 2) 
compliance with FDCA regulations is not a defense to a Lanham Act 
claim. Companies regulated by the FDCA must be careful to ensure that 
they are properly following FDCA regulations, while not engaging in 
misleading or deceptive marketing practices. 
